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If one cluster increases local competitiveness, can politicians, by interlinking clusters, achieve 
an even better effect at the state level? To answer this question, the paper analyzes the 
“Cluster Initiative” introduced in 1999 by the Bavarian State Government. The purpose of the 
initiative was to create a Bavarian-wide innovation network in support of state-wide 
knowledge flows. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that introducing the 
Bavarian-wide cluster policy increased the likelihood of innovation by a firm in the targeted 
industry by 4 to 7 percentage points. However, this effect is mainly driven by large firms’ 
increased likelihood to innovate. 
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1. Introduction 
Paradoxically, even though the world is becoming increasingly globalized, with decreasing 
transportation and transaction costs diminishing distances and allowing global sourcing, there 
is at the same time a rich body of academic literature celebrating the “re-emergence of local 
economics” (Sable 1989). Most firms can now easily spread their activities around the world, 
and yet they choose to cluster some activities in certain regions. This phenomenon leads 
Porter (1998, p.  90) to the conclusion that “enduring competitive advantages in a global 
economy are often heavily localized, arising from concentrations of highly specialized skills 
and knowledge, institutions, rivalry, related businesses, and sophisticated customers.” Porter 
calls a regional concentration of certain firms or industries that benefit from the local 
environment a cluster, a term that quickly became a major buzzword in the field of regional 
economics. 
Porter’s concept of clusters is a practical application of a wide body of literature in the field of 
agglomeration theories. However, it lacks a sound theoretical framework and does not provide 
any empirical evidence beyond case studies. Thus, the cluster concept eventually gains 
legitimacy by incorporating more specialized approaches which can be found in the field of 
agglomeration theory. Among the theory-driven approaches, the fairly recent field of “New 
Economic Geography” focuses on the pecuniary external scale economies arising from 
decreasing transportation and transaction costs (cf. Krugman 1991, Fujita et al. 2000); 
approaches related to the industrial organization literature focus on modeling the mechanism 
of knowledge spillovers (cf. Loury 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980); and empirical analyses 
attempt to explain the process of regional agglomeration (Ellison and Glaeser 1997), and 
examine the role of spillovers (Griliches 1979; Acs et al. 1994) and knowledge flows (Jaffe et 
al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996). However, and particularly outside the academic 
arena, it is still Porter’s cluster approach that is the dominant analytical concept in regional 2 
development. “From the OECD and the World Bank, to national governments (such as the 
UK, France, Germany the Netherlands, Portugal, and New Zealand), to regional development 
agencies (such as the new Regional Development Agencies in the UK), to local and city 
governments (including various US States), policy-makers at all levels have become eager to 
promote local business clusters” (Martin and Sunley 2003, p. 6). 
The popularity of Porter’s cluster concept is based in its generality and vagueness; thus it can 
be employed in a variety of contexts. According to Porter, clusters may occur at different 
geographic levels and he also stresses the importance of social ties as a cluster’s social glue. 
However, he does not define clear boundaries for a cluster’s geographic or industrial 
extension. The same is true for the concept of social ties as “pipes” for knowledge flows; 
Porter (1998, p.  202) only mentions that “cluster boundaries should encompass all firms, 
industries, and institutions with strong linkages [while] those with weak and non-existent 
linkages can safely be left out.” Against this background, Martin and Sunley (2003) question 
the practicability and profundity of Porter’s cluster concept and fear that the arbitrary 
deployment of cluster policies could mean taking the right sort of step but in the wrong 
direction. One example of a bound understanding of the mechanisms underlying a cluster is 
the attempt to push structurally weak regions toward forming a cluster by awarding grants to a 
university in the hope that a great deal of valuable knowledge will be produced and leads to a 
thriving environment. Unfortunately, knowledge created in a vacuum has no way of escaping. 
Against this background, the paper intends to provide some empirical evidence for the 
applicability of the cluster concept as policy tool to support cooperation among industries and 
thus support regional competitiveness. In 1999, the Bavarian State Government introduced a 
“Cluster Initiative” with the aim of creating a Bavarian-wide innovation network in support of 
state-wide knowledge flows. Using a difference-in-differences approach, which has been 
fruitfully applied in labor economics to identify the causal effect of labor market programs on 3 
a certain outcome (e.g., the probability of finding a job), we identify the causal effect of the 
Bavarian cluster-oriented economic policy on firms’ innovation behavior. We find that the 
introduction of the Bavarian-wide cluster policy increased the likelihood of innovation by a 
firm in the targeted industry by 4 to 7 percentage points. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical basis for the 
economic mechanisms assumed to underlie a cluster and Section 3 describes the Bavarian 
Cluster Initiative. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the empirical method and the data, leading to the 
results presented in Section  6. Finally, Section  7 concludes with implications for further 
research and for the use of a cluster policy. 
2. Clusters, Innovation, and the Role of Policy 
Local agglomerations, or “clusters”, are theorized to influence firm competitiveness in at least 
three ways. Cooperation of firms along the supply chain stimulates productivity enhancing 
process innovations; the geographical proximity of different firms induces knowledge flows 
that can be the basis of product innovations; and externalities in the production of knowledge 
can be absorbed by new businesses. These agglomeration effects have their foundation in 
Marshall’s (1890) idea of external economies of scale resulting from access to a common 
labor market and shared public goods, saved transportation and transaction costs due to the 
proximity of firms along the supply chain, and spillovers that result from industry secrets 
being readily discerned due to proximity. Taken together, these externalities contribute to 
local endogenous innovation and productivity growth (Martin and Sunley 1998). The 
underlying mechanism is as follows. According to Baumol (2002), successful innovation is 
the major weapon employed by incumbents against entry and/or competition and Aghion et 
al. (2008) integrate this concept into a Schumpeterian growth model where innovation drives 
dynamics and growth results from incumbents’ attempt to “escape entry” or “escape 
competition.” 4 
All these concepts are based in the understanding that competition for new ideas has become 
the major driver of economic growth in today’s knowledge-based society. When engaged in 
fierce competition at the technological frontier, constant innovation is the only way a firm can 
match up to competitors in the long run. So, if knowledge and new ideas are drivers of growth 
and dynamics, what determines their location and fluctuation? 
In an attempt to provide some empirical evidence for the location decision of firms, Ellison 
and Glaeser (1997) propose an index to measure geographic industry concentration. Starting 
from a situation where firms choose their location merely for idiosyncratic purposes, they 
trace the occurrence of “over-agglomerations” to the existence of two kinds of agglomerative 
forces—natural advantages and spillovers. While natural advantages may explain the location 
decision of resource-based industries, such as mining, wine production, or shipbuilding, 
spillovers are more likely to explain the location decision of knowledge-based industries 
where knowledge spillovers result from “working on similar things and hence benefiting from 
each other’s research” (Griliches 1992). The close interconnection between the social and the 
economic networks within a community (e.g., friends who work for different firms) makes 
knowledge spill over—it jumps, or runs, or “spills” from firm to firm via the social network. 
Thus, a community’s social life acts as a knowledge multiplier, increasing the pool of 
geographically bound knowledge (cf. Anselin et al. 1997). 
Depending on a region’s industry structure, agglomeration theory distinguishes between two 
types of knowledge flows that result in spillovers. On the one hand, there are Marshall-
Arrow-Romer externalities from regional specialization in one particular industry, leading to 
so-called localization economies. These externalities are most likely to result from firm 
relations along the supply chain where shared routines and knowledge allow for productivity 
enhancing (process) innovations. On the other hand, there are Jacobs externalities resulting 
from knowledge flows between firms of different industries. Following Jacobs (1969), a 
diverse industry structure in support of such urbanization economies is most likely to be 5 
found in metropolitan areas where there is a diverse firm structure along with private and 
public R&D laboratories engaged in basic research, thereby creating knowledge that can 
“spill” out into the air, thus creating an atmosphere comprised of a variety of intellectual 
externalities just waiting to be absorbed. These inter-industry spillovers are considered 
especially important as they can lead to the discovery of something completely new, for 
example, a product or a process, which in turn leads to growth as the new thing is developed 
and enhanced and promoted (cf. Glaeser et al. 1992). 
All externalities result from regional cooperation in the creation of input factors, which, in 
turn, contribute to the competitiveness of all local firms. Accordingly, government, in its 
desire for dynamic and prospering regions, has an incentive to support the development of 
such clusters. However, firms and other actors cannot be forced to cooperate from the top 
down by government; instead, cooperation is the result of continuous contact and the trust that 
grows from it. As mentioned by Schmitz (1999, p. 142), “for a deep division of labor and 
cooperation between firms to be effective at reasonable cost, trust is essential.” Trust is 
crucial, then, in the diffusion of regional knowledge. 
However, there are two sides to knowledge diffusion. On the “dark” side, rapid knowledge 
diffusion undermines the appropriability of “exclusive” rents arising from the lock in of 
knowledge. However, on the “brighter” side, knowledge diffusion across a network of firms, 
or, in other words, a cluster, can also act as a multiplier, resulting in the creation of new 
knowledge and, therefore, additional but “collective” rents open to all firms in the region. Of 
course, whether this multiplier is a benefit is critically dependent on the extent to which the 
firm will have access to the collective rents from a local knowledge stock, i.e., the intensity of 
knowledge diffusion. In this regard, trust in reciprocity assures that each network member is 
willing to feed the network with new knowledge (Powell 1990). Also, the stronger the social 
ties within a network, the higher the probability of being caught out as a free-rider. Assuming 6 
that free-riding would, in a worst-case scenario, lead to an exclusion from the network, the 
costs of free-riding usually exceed the benefits. 
The importance of strong social ties suggests that trust is more likely to develop between 
geographically proximate agents because transactions and cooperation in form of frequent 
face-to-face contacts and informal meetings is less costly at this level (Dei Ottati 1994; 
Williamson 1999). However, if knowledge flows are determined only by geographical 
proximity and, hence, costs of transactions and cooperation, there remains an important policy 
question, namely: Are there additional gains from cooperation and could these be exploited by 
interlinking existing local clusters? Regarding the gains, Burt’s (1992) theory of structural 
holes suggests that a network’s dynamics are largely driven by the creation of new productive 
ties between existing networks that allow for additional knowledge flows. This leaves us with 
the question of whether politicians can build on existing network structures and try to 
strengthen and develop them as part of a public-private partnership. 
This sort of public-private partnership would be especially interested in creating connecting 
platforms that increase knowledge flows. Such platforms connect actors of similar industries 
and thus create new and productive ties. Knowledge creation and innovation particularly gain 
from firm cooperation as the individual risk of failure decreases. Furthermore, pooling ideas 
from different firms can act as a multiplier—that is, each firm “stands on the shoulders” of the 
others. Additionally, government can support (basic) research institutions that further 
stimulate the innovation process, as well as provide other services that leverage innovation by 
making private R&D more effective. However, it must be noted that such institutions create 
spillovers and have the desired result only if they are already embedded in an existing industry 
structure. 
By providing infrastructure in the form of supporting institutions and services, government 
acts, in a Schumpeterian manner, as an entrepreneur and provides leadership by, first, 7 
recognizing an opportunity and, second, taking advantage of it. Note, however, that this does 
not mean that government should act as the entrepreneur by actually creating new firms or 
products. We are in agreement with Hayek (1978) in this matter, and believe that politicians 
do not have better information than the market and thus should not interfere with the market’s 
search for new ideas. Rather, government should be entrepreneurial by creating supporting 
institutions and services for up and coming industries. For instance, today’s knowledge-based 
production is heavily dependent on human capital and creativity and thus requires a different 
environment than a capital-based mass production economy. This environment is very fluid 
and can change quickly and so government needs to keep a careful eye on the future, 
watching for developments and trends, so as to be able to adjust institutions in a time-
appropriate way. In this context, the government’s success—its pioneer rent—is reflected in a 
prospering and dynamic environment that attracts firms and eventually results in a regional 
agglomeration or cluster. 
3. The Bavarian State-Wide Cluster Policy 
One example of governmental action to foster cooperation among industries in order to 
support regional competitiveness is the Bavarian State Government’s “Cluster Initiative,” the 
focus of this paper. Since its introduction in 1999, the Cluster Imitative has worked to further 
mobilize the inherent strengths of companies through the formation of tightly woven regional 
cooperation networks in the form of clusters. Bavaria is one of the largest German states and 
thus it should be possible to discern the effects of a state-wide cluster policy as compared to 
more narrowly defined local cluster policies that exist in all German states. Once we have 
done so, we will be able to evaluate whether it is useful to pursue a cluster policy at the state 
level or whether all the possibly positive effects of clusters are locally bound.
1 If we discover 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the cluster policies in German states, see Kiese and Schätzl (2008). 8 
a positive effect of the Bavarian state-wide cluster policy, it will be a clear indication that 
cluster effects are not completely locally bound. 
In 1999, Bavaria was the first German state to initiate a highly visible, state-wide cluster 
policy. The Cluster Initiative allocated around 1.45 billion euro for developing prime 
technologies in the state. This program was the successor to the Initiative for Bavaria’s Future 
Development, which was begun in 1994 with a budget of around 4 billion euros, but no clear 
direction as to how this money should be spent. The 1999 initiative remedied this lack of 
direction by defining five key technologies as eligible for support: life science, information 
and communication technology, new materials, environmental technologies, and 
mechatronics. The initiative rests on four pillars: the development of world-class technology 
centers; technology concepts for all areas within Bavaria; a state-wide qualification, 
infrastructure, and start-up network; and the internationalization of the initiative. One of the 
initiative’s chief goals is to link science, business, and finance in order to foster innovation 
activity and development in Bavaria. 
Not until 2001 did other German states follow Bavaria’s lead and introduce their own state-
wide policies (Hesse and Saarland took such a step in 2001, Thuringia followed in 2002). 
However, the Bavarian program dwarfs the other states’ programs, both in visibility and 
scope. 
4. Method 
In theory, the main advantage of clusters is their contribution to innovation by way of 
competition. Thus, we are interested in estimating the effect of a state-wide cluster policy on 
the innovation of firms in the targeted industries. Therefore, we use difference-in-differences 
methodology (cf. Campbell 1969; Card 1990). The key estimation equation is the following: 
fsit fsit sit t i s fsit X cluster inno ε χ β α α α + + + + + = .   (1) 9 
Here, f stands for the firm, s for the state, i for the industry, and t for time. The outcome 
variable  inno is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if firm f has introduced an 
innovation in year t.  s α are state fixed effects,  i α are industry fixed effects, and  t α  are time 
fixed effects. 
The cluster variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when there is a cluster policy 
in industry i in state s in year t. The coefficient β  is the coefficient of interest indicating the 
effect of the cluster policy on a firm’s innovation behavior. 
X is a matrix of control variables. It includes time-varying control variables at both the state 
and industry level. These control variables, which capture state-specific and industry-specific 
business cycles that may affect innovation, consist of employment growth rates at different 
levels of aggregation and are derived from the Social Insurance Statistics. In addition, we 
consider firm-level control variables, namely, the firm size and whether the firm has 
introduced an innovation in the preceding year. The latter variable captures all unobserved 
time-invariant firm-level impetus for innovation. 
As the dependent variable is binary, Equation (1) is estimated by both a linear probability 
model and by a probit model. In both procedures, cluster-robust standard errors are calculated 
at the state level. Calculating cluster-robust standard errors accounts for adding covariates at 
different levels of aggregation (cf. Moulton 1986) and for interrelations of firms within a state 
(cf. Williams 2000). These interrelations may result along the supply chain (input-output 
relations) or may be the result of cooperation in the innovation process. 
5. Data 
Industry-specific innovation activities of manufacturing firms are derived from the Ifo 
Innovation Survey (see Lachenmaier 2007, for a description of the dataset). More than 1,000 
surveyed firms report yearly on whether or not they have introduced an innovation, i.e., a 
product or process innovation. Furthermore, firms report whether the innovation required 10 
R&D expenditures or resulted from a patent. In our opinion, this detail captures the notion 
that those innovations that required R&D are of greater importance than those that did not and 
that those innovations that were patented are of even higher importance due to the fact that 
patenting is costly. However, as patenting behavior is highly industry specific (cf. 
pharmaceutics), we give first preference to the innovations that required R&D expenditure 
when evaluating the importance of an innovation. 
The surveyed firms are a subsample of firms that are surveyed monthly for business cycle 
research. Because these firms participate regularly in the Innovation Survey, the panel 
character of the data is guaranteed.  
The voluntary character of the Ifo innovation survey does not necessarily lead to a sample that 
is representative for Germany as a whole. Therefore, we compare the distribution of firms in 
our sample with the population of firms provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Doing so 
shows that we oversample large firms and undersample small firms throughout the sample 
period (cf. Figure A1 in the Appendix). This is because business cycle research surveys tend 
to include a larger number of large firms that represent a large share of the economy in terms 
of employees and/or sales. Furthermore, the 2-digit-NACE industries 15 and 28 are notably 
underrepresented in the Ifo survey while industry 21 is overrepresented (cf. Figure A2 in the 
Appendix).  
The federal states of Bavaria, Saxony, and Thuringia are over-represented compared to other 
German regions. This over-representation possibly results from the geographical proximity of 
the surveying research institute—the Ifo Institute of Economic Research—to all three regions 
(cf. Figure A3 in the Appendix). However, for our purpose the treatment group are Bavarian 
firms, while the control group consists of firms in all other states. Therefore, the exact 
distribution of the control group is less important—as long as we control for location. 
Consequently, we can still make our inferences by controlling for firm size, industry, and state 11 
affiliation of the firm. Following Winship & Radbill (1994), this is both appropriate and more 
efficient than weighing the data. 
As already mentioned, we regroup the surveyed firms from two-digit manufacturing 
industries into 10 broader industry groups to obtain the largest possible overlap with the 
technologies defined in the state-wide Bavarian cluster program (cf. Table A1 in the 
Appendix). The data from the Ifo Innovation Survey are available from 1982 to 2006. To 
track a single firm before and after the introduction of a specific state-wide cluster policy, we 
consider only those firms in our data with a spell that spans from three years before the 
introduction of the cluster policy to three years after its introduction, i.e., 1996–2001. This 
restriction forced us to remove a large number of firms from our sample. However, we want 
to use the panel character of our data in order to control for time-invariant unobserved firm 
characteristics and we do not want to extend the time span beyond 2001 as state-wide cluster 
policies were introduced in other German states at that time. This procedure results in a firm-
level balanced panel dataset with six yearly observations per firm. Additionally, possible 
endogeneity of the form that firms might be induced to change their location from some other 
state to Bavaria in order to benefit from the initiative is taken care of. Only those firms are 
included in the finale sample that did not move between states during the six years. Our final 
sample consists of 270 firms; each of the firms is followed for six years. Seventy-four of the 
firms are located in Bavaria; 196 are located in other German states. Out of the 74 firms 
located in Bavaria, 46 belong to industries targeted by the cluster policy. Of the 270 firms in 
our sample, 41 have more than 500 employees. 
Figure 1 provides a preliminary look at the evolution of innovations across industries and 
states. Yearly innovation rates for our sample are simply calculated as the number of firms 
that have introduced an innovation over all firms in a state’s industry. Thereby, innovation 
rates are calculated on the basis of important innovations, i.e., innovations that required R&D 
expenditures. Figure  1 plots the evolution of innovation rates before and after the 1999 12 
introduction of the state-wide cluster policy in Bavaria. Innovations rates are calculated 
separately both for industries that were targeted by the cluster policy and for industries that 
were not. A further distinction is made between Bavarian industries and industries in states 
that have not introduced a state-wide cluster policy. 
Figure 1: The Evolution of Innovation Rates (Important Innovations) 








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bavaria - cluster industries Bavaria - non-cluster industries Other states - cluster industries Other states - non-cluster industries
 
Figure 1 has three very striking aspects. First, innovation rates in industries targeted by the 
Bavarian cluster policy are higher than those for other industries, both in Bavaria and in the 
other German states. However, as these differences in the levels of innovation rates are later 
on wiped out in the difference-in-differences approach by the fixed effects, they are of no 
further importance in light of this paper. Secondly, innovation rates in the industries targeted 
by the Bavarian cluster policy show an increase in the year of the policy’s introduction and 
even though this rate decreases slightly in the next, the rate continues to be as least as high 
every year after the initiative’s introduction as it was prior to introduction. Thirdly, the same 
year (1999) that the Bavarian cluster policy was introduced, a clear peak in the innovation 
rates appears. To ensure that we do not just evaluate the short-term deflagration effect based 
on the Bavarian cluster policy’s introduction, we will analyze its effect over a three-year time 13 
span. As discussed above, we do not want to extend the analysis beyond 2001 because other 
German states start introducing their own policies in that year. 
6. Results 
Table 1 reports the results of our estimations. The left panel of Table 1 shows the results of 
the linear probability model; the probit estimates are set out in the right panel. The dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 when the firm has either introduced an innovation in general or 
an innovation that required R&D expenditure, the latter reflective of a more important 
innovation. The coefficient of interest is the cluster variable coefficient, which can be 
interpreted as the impact of the state-wide Bavarian cluster policy on innovations in the 
targeted industries. 
Table 1: Results 
  Linear Probability Model  Probit Model 
  Innovation in general  Important innovation  Innovation in general  Important innovation 
Cluster  0.0470 0.0658** 0.198*  0.287** 
  (1.73) (2.26) (1.88)  (2.46) 
lagged 
innovation 0.451***  0.491***  1.285***  1.435*** 
  (16.2) (14.9) (14.8)  (13.2) 
lagged 
employees (log)  0.0678***  0.0606***  0.278***  0.254*** 
  (10.1) (7.24) (8.46)  (6.12) 
Industry-level 
employment 
growth rate  -0.0205  -0.0446  -0.0502  -0.168 
  (-0.69) (-1.07) (-0.58)  (-0.89) 
State-level 
employment 
growth rate  0.0684 0.0859  0.311 0.342 
  (0.73) (0.87) (0.64)  (0.78) 
Constant  0.298*** -0.394***  -1.509***  -1.209*** 
  (3.15) (-7.25)  (-3.57)  (-3.05) 
Year dummies  incl. incl. incl.  incl. 
Industry 
dummies incl.  incl.  incl.  incl. 
State dummies  incl. incl. incl.  incl. 
Observations  1342 1312 1332  1307 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.38 0.42  0.325  0.362 
Cluster-robust standard errors on the state level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level. 
We find that the state-wide Bavarian cluster policy had a positive impact on innovation. The 
magnitude of the effects is economically meaningful. The interpretation of the linear 14 
probability models leads to the result that the introduction of the state-wide cluster policy 
increases the likelihood of innovation by a firm in the targeted industries by 4.7 to 6.58 
percentage points. However, when taking innovation in general, the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. To interpret the coefficients reported in the probit model we 
have to calculate the marginal effects. As in Puhani (2008), we compute these marginal 
effects for a discrete change in the cluster variable from zero to one for all firms subject to the 
Bavarian initiative. In other words, we calculate the marginal effect as mean over the 
individual marginal effects of all firms in the treatment group. Standard errors are calculated 
by the delta method. Again, the calculated standard errors are the means over all individual 
standard errors. Doing this, leads to a positive marginal effect of the cluster initiative on the 
likelihood of innovation of 4.9 to 7 percentage points for innovation in general and important 
innovation respectively (cf. Table 4). 
As robustness checks, we also run the regressions for West German states only as it is 
possible that development in East Germany, due to its different history, might be driven by 
factors other than those at play in West Germany. Furthermore, we run the regressions for the 
largest West German territorial states, i.e., Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-
Westphalia, and Lower Saxony. In these larger states, it should be possible to disentangle the 
effects of a state-wide cluster policy from the effects of the more narrowly defined local 
cluster policies that exist in all German states, whereas in the smaller states even a very local 
cluster policy might actually encompass the entire state. Table 2 shows that the coefficients of 
the cluster variable become somewhat smaller in the linear probability model, although the 
changes are not dramatic. In the preferred probit specification coefficients of the cluster 
variable also decrease slightly but remain significant, especially so in the sub-sample of West 
German territorial states. For the interpretation of those coefficients we again have to 
calculate the marginal effects. Doing this we can report increases of the probability to 15 
Table 2: Results, West Germany and Large Territorial States 
  Linear Probability Model  Probit Model 
  West German States  West German large territorial States West German States  West German large territorial States 
















Cluster  0.0403 0.0521 0.0486**  0.0548  0.181* 0.246*  0.214***  0.254** 
  (1.44) (1.61)  (3.44)  (1.93)  (1.68) (1.83)  (4.40)  (2.26) 
lagged innovation  0.415*** 0.452***  0.429***  0.459***  1.168*** 1.306***  1.215***  1.345*** 
  (20.3) (17.6)  (21.7)  (18.1)  (19.7) (15.6)  (25.2)  (19.7) 
lagged employees 
(log) 0.0756***  0.0691***  0.0744***  0.0715***  0.316***  0.295***  0.316***  0.308*** 
  (12.7) (9.42)  (11.3)  (8.51)  (10.5) (7.19)  (8.05)  (5.70) 
Industry-level 
employment growth 
rate -0.0499**  -0.0840***  0.197  0.390  -0.139**  -0.558*  0.293  1.512 
  (-2.88) (-3.45)  (0.63)  (1.58)  (-2.09) (-1.88)  (0.15)  (0.64) 
State-level 
employment growth 
rate 0.0493  0.0650  -0.484  -0.498  0.247  0.263  -1.966  -2.055* 
  (0.48) (0.50)  (-1.44)  (-2.06)  (0.43) (0.49)  (-1.49)  (-1.91) 
Constant  0.372** -0.119  -0.00821  -0.150  -1.410*** -2.555***  -2.414***  -2.366*** 
  (3.02)  (-1.56)  (-0.096)  (-1.95) (-4.02)  (-8.48) (-11.3)  (-4.78) 
Year dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl.  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
Industry dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl.  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
State dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl.  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
Observations  1113 1089  895  876  1108 1089  880  876 
Adjusted R-squared  0.38 0.42  0.39  0.44  0.327  0.364  0.333  0.384 
Cluster-robust standard errors on the state level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
** statistically significant at the 5% level. 
* statistically significant at the 10% level. 16 
innovate between 4.6 and 6.2 percentage points (cf. table 4). This confirms our results of the 
baseline specification in Table 1.  
Cluster policies, or industrial policies in general, are often criticized as being especially 
supportive of large firms that are already politically well connected (cf. Seabright 2005). To 
assess whether this is true, we add to our estimation an interaction term between the cluster 
variable and a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm has more than 500 employees. We 
use 500 employees as the cutoff point as it is common to define small and medium-sized 
firms as those with less than 500 employees. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results, Large vs. Small and Medium-Sized Firms  
  Linear Probability Model  Probit Model 
  Innovation in general  Important innovation  Innovation in general  Important innovation
Cluster  0.0416 0.0447  0.140  0.194* 
  (1.47) (1.54)  (1.36)  (1.77) 
Cluster x firm size 
dummy 0.0237  0.0904**  0.582***  0.816*** 
  (0.82) (2.72)  (5.61)  (6.34) 
lagged innovation  0.451*** 0.490***  1.280***  1.428*** 
  (16.2) (14.9)  (14.5)  (13.2) 
lagged employees 
(log) 0.0671***  0.0579***  0.269***  0.240*** 
  (8.71) (5.82)  (7.46)  (5.36) 
Industry-level 
employment 
growth rate  -0.0205 -0.0445  -0.0510  -0.169 
  (-0.69) (-1.07)  (-0.59)  (-0.89) 
State-level 
employment 
growth rate  0.0683  0.0854  0.309  0.337 
  (0.73) (0.87)  (0.64)  (0.77) 
Constant  0.302*** -0.383***  -1.453***  -1.114*** 
  (3.17) (-6.37)  (-3.35)  (-2.65) 
Year dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
Industry dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
State dummies  incl. incl.  incl.  incl. 
Observations  1342 1312  1332  1307 
Adjusted R-squared  0.38 0.42  0.326  0.364 
 Cluster-robust standard errors on the state level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level. 
** statistically significant at the 5% level. 
* statistically significant at the 10% level. 
These results confirm that the cluster policy is especially supportive of large firms. In the 
linear probability model the impact of the cluster policy on a large firm’s likelihood to 
innovate in the targeted industry is 2.3 and 9 percentage points greater than it is for small and 17 
medium-sized firms, although only the coefficient in the model for important innovations is 
statistically significant.  
In the probit model, the marginal effect of the cluster variable is of interest only for small 
firms. However, for large firms two estimated effects are jointly at play, which are the 
marginal effects of the cluster variable and the interaction variable. The difference between 
the effect on large and on small firms amount to 3.4 percentage points for innovations in 
general and 6.9 percentage points for important innovations (cf. Table  4). Those on-top 
effects for large firms are significant and economically important.  
Table 4: Marginal Effects of the cluster variable – Probit models 
  Marginal effect  Standard error  t-value  p-value 
Innovation in general:        
Table1: baseline model  0.049  0.027  1.810  0.086 
Table 2: only West German States  0.046  0.028  1.599  0.126 
Table 2: only West German large territorial states  0.054  0.014  4.128  0.023 
Table 3: effect for small firms  0.040  0.029  1.392  0.168 
Table 3: effect for large firms  0.074  0.029  2.381  0.068 
        
Important Innovation:        
Table1: baseline model  0.070  0.030  2.339  0.043 
Table 2: only West German States  0.061  0.036  1.716  0.109 
Table 2: only West German large territorial states  0.062  0.030  2.181  0.075 
Table 3: effect for small firms  0.052  0.029  1.856  0.071 
Table 3: effect for large firms  0.121  0.045  2.549  0.056 
Reported marginal effects and standard errors are the means of the individual marginal effects and standard 
errors of the treatment group. 
Reported standard errors are computed by the delta method. 
For an overview, all marginal effects reported in this section are summarized graphically in 
Figure 2. 18 




This paper presents empirical evidence for the success of an economic policy that aims to 
extend the geographic boundaries of a cluster. To do so, we analyze the “Cluster Initiative” 
introduced in 1999 by the Bavarian State Government, which was aimed at creating a 
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Bavarian-wide innovation network in support of state-wide knowledge flows. By means of a 
difference-in-differences approach, we find that the introduction of the Bavarian-wide cluster 
policy increased the likelihood of an innovation by a firm in the targeted industry by 4 to 7 
percentage points, but that this effect is mainly driven by the increase in the likelihood of 
large firms to innovate. 
Even though we identify a positive effect of the Bavarian Cluster Initiative on the likelihood 
of firms to innovate, we cannot answer the question of whether the 1.45 billion euro allocated 
by Bavaria to this program was a valuable investment. To answer this question, a cost-benefit 
analysis would be necessary that compares the cost of the program with the economic value of 
the innovations induced by the program. Furthermore, a comparison with the cost-benefit 
analyses of other programs aimed at stimulating innovation would be necessary. 
From an academic perspective, it would be interesting to analyze in further research exactly 
what type of innovation impetus was stimulated by the cluster policy. Did the impetus for 
innovation come from related firms along the supply chain, from customers, or from 
universities? Furthermore, it would be interesting to take a closer look at outcomes other than 
innovation. For instance, cluster polices are often targeted not only at stimulating innovation 
within incumbent firms but also at stimulating innovative firm entry as it is known that many 
radical innovations are introduced by young firms (cf. Audretsch 1995). 20 
References 
Acs, Zoltan J., David B. Audretsch, Maryann P. Feldman (1994) R&D Spillovers and 
Recipient Firm Size, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 336–340. 
Aghion Philippe, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, Peter Howitt, S. Prantl (2008) The 
Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, forthcoming. 
Anselin, Luc, A. Varga, Z. Acs (1997) Local Geographic Spillovers Between University 
Research and High Technology Innovations, Journal of Urban Economics, 24, 422–448. 
Audretsch, David (1995) Innovation and Industry Evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Audretsch, David B., Maryann P. Feldman (1996) R&D Spillovers and the Geography of 
Innovation and Production, American Economic Review, 83, 630–640. 
Baumol, William J. (2002) Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Growth: The David-Goliath 
Symbiosis, Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, 7(2), 1–10. 
Burt, Ronald S. (1992) Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Campbell, Donald T. (1969) Reforms as Experiments, American Psychologist, 24, 409–429. 
Card, David E. (1990) The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 245–257. 
Dasgupta, Partha, Joseph Stiglitz (1980) Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of 
R&D, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 1–28. 
Dei Ottati, Gabi (1994) Trust, Interlinking Transactions and Credit in the Industrial District, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18(6), 529–546. 
Ellison, Glenn, Edward L. Glaeser (1997) Geographic Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing 
Industries: A Dartboard Approach, Journal of Political Economy 105, 889–927. 
Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman, Anthony Venables (2000) The Spatial Economy: Cities, 
Regions, and International Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Glaeser, Edward, Heidi Kallal, José A. Scheinkman, Andrei Shleifer (1992). Growth of Cities, 
Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1126–1152. 
Griliches, Zvi (1979) Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to 
Productivity Growth, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 92–116. 
Griliches, Zvi (1992). The Search for R&D Spillovers, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
94, 29–47. 
Hayek, F. A. von (1978). Competition as a discovery procedure, in F. A. von Hayek, New 
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 179-190. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Jacobs, Jane (1969) The Economy of Cities. New York, NY: Random House. 21 
Jaffe, Adam, Manuel Trajtenberg, Rebecca Henderson (1993) Geographic Localization of 
Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
63, 577–598. 
Kiese, Matthias , Ludwig Schätzl (eds.) (2008) Cluster und Regionalentwicklung. Dortmund: 
Verlag Dorothea Rohn. 
Krugman, Paul (1991) Geography and Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lachenmaier, Stefan (2007) Effects of Innovation on Firm Performance. Munich: Ifo 
Contributions to Economic Research. 
Loury, Glenn C. (1979) Market Structure and Innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
93, 395–410. 
Marshall, Alfred (1890) Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. 
Martin, Ronald L., Peter Sunley (1998) Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous Growth 
Theory and Regional Development, Economic Geography, 74, 201–227. 
Martin, Ronald, Peter Sunley (2003) Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concept or Policy 
Panacea, Journal of Economic Geography, 3, 5–35. 
Moulton, Brent R. (1986) Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates, 
Journal of Econometrics, 32, 385–397. 
Porter, Michael (1998) On Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Powell, Walter (1990) Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 
Research in Organizational Behaviour, 12, 295–336. 
Puhani, Patrick (2008) The Treatment Effect, the Cross Difference, and the Interaction Term 
in Nonlinear “Difference-in-Differences” Models, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3478. 
Sable, Cole (1989) Flexible Specialization and the Re-Emergence of Regional Economics, in: 
P. Hirst & J. Zeitlin (eds.) Reversing Industrial Decline: Industrial Structure and Policies 
in Britain and Her Competitors, 17–70. Oxford: Berg. 
Schmitz, Hubert (1999) From Ascribed to Earned Trust in Exporting Clusters, Journal of 
International Economics, 48, 139–50. 
Seabright, Paul (2005) National and European Champions—Burden or Blessing? CESifo 
Forum 2/2005, 52–55. 
Williams, Rick L. (2000) A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-Correlated Data, 
Biometrics, 56, 645–646. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1999) The Economics of Transaction Costs. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Winship, Christopher, Larry Radbill (1994) Sampling Weights and Regression Analysis, 












1 - 49 50 - 99 100 - 199 200 - 499 500 - 999 1000++
ifo Fed.Stat.Office
 23 











[28] Fabricated Metal Products
[29] Machinery and Equipment n.e.c.
[15] Food products and beverages
[26] Other non-metallic Mineral Products
[25] Rubber and Plastic Products
[22] Publishing and Printing
[31] Electrical Machinery
[33] Medical and Optical Instruments
[36] Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
[24] Chemicals




[21] Pulp, Paper and Paper Products+
[18] Wearing Apparel
[32] Radio, TV, communication
[35] Other Transport Equipment
[19] Leather
[30] Office Machinery and Computers
[23] Coke and Petroleum Products
[16] Tobacco Products
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Table A1: Regrouping of Industries 
  Regrouped industries  2-digit industries 
[1] Life sciences  [33] Medical and optical 
instruments 
[30] Office machinery and 
computers  [2] Information and communication 
technologies 
[32] Radio, TV, communication 
[17] Textiles 
[24] Chemicals 
[25] Rubber and plastic products 
[26] Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
[27] Basic metals 
[3] New materials 
[28] Fabricated metal products 
[20] Wood and wood products  [4] Environmental technologies 
[31] Electrical machinery 
[29] Machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. 
[34] Motor vehicles 
Targeted by the Bavarian cluster 
policy  
[5] Mechatronics 
[35] Other transport equipment 
[15] Food products and beverages.   [6] Tobacco and Food 
[16] Tobacco products 
[18] Wearing apparel  [7] Apparel 
[19] Leather 
[21] Pulp, paper, and paper products [8] Paper and printing 
[22] Publishing and printing 
[9] Mineral products and coking  [23] Coke and petroleum products 
Other industries 
[10] Jewelry and furniture  [36] Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 
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